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I. Democracy is a dynamic idea 
 
Democracy is one of the great ideas of mankind. The principle that people govern 
themselves is far from trivial but rather surprising. It seems that for hundreds, if not 
thousands, of years the natural order in the public sphere was an authoritarian and 
often dictatorial rule. Today, self-determination in politics has become the ideal 
everybody accepts. This is reflected in the fact that even dictators and authoritarian 
rulers make a great effort to appear democratic. Not rarely, regimes that suppressed 
any idea of self-determination of their citizens, explicitly called themselves 
„democracies“. The German Democratic Republic is a case in point.  
The virtually general acceptance of democracy as the only legitimate form of 
government has its downside. Democracy has become “sacred”, i.e. has reached a 
position in which criticism is ill considered. It appears that once a “democratic state” 
(irrespective of whether it deserves that name or not) has been achieved, the ideal has 
been reached and no changes and further developments are considered.  
I wish to argue in this paper that such a contentment undermines the very idea of 
democracy which I see as a dynamic concept which should be open to criticism and 
change. In particular, I consider two possible developments: 
(a) More political power should be given to the citizens, and perhaps to other 
members of the population. Representative democracy was a great 
achievement but direct democracy is the appropriate form of democracy for 
the 21st century. 
(b) Many innovations are possible in democracy. I shall mention a few but want to 
focus on the potential role of random mechanisms to secure that the population 
is more fully represented in the political process both with respect to the 
persons in politics and the decisions taken. 
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 Section II sketches the tree major stages of democracy and section III deals with the 
fundamental problems of democracy and of other organizations. Referendum 
democracy is discussed in section IV, including its strengths and weaknesses. The 
following section asks why there are so few Referendum Democracies. Section VI 
mentions some innovative extensions of democracy with respect to voting rules and 
procedures. Section VII lists some innovations beyond traditional democracy, in 
particular the use of random mechanisms such as probability voting and demarchy. 
The last section offers conclusions. 
 
II. Three stages of democracy 
After hundreds and thousands of years of authoritarian and dictatorial regimes direct 
democracy appeared in classical Athens. Despite its well-known limitations (in 
particular that a large share of the population was excluded from political 
participation) this was an extraordinary achievement. It took a long time until the 
French revolution introduced representative democracy in order to allow a large 
population to participate in political affairs. The third stage of democracy is based on 
direct participation rights of the citizens via popular referenda. This establishes the 
citizens’ position as the sovereign which has the last word. 
The advent of each of these stages can be considered a social innovation of great 
importance. The following three sections discuss the last stage of referendum 
democracy compared to the representative elements as they still exist in most 
democracies in the world. 
 
III. Fundamental problems of democracy 
Democracy can be looked at in terms of a principal agent problem as it exists in all 
institutions. The principal is the owner of the organization and wants to reach specific 
goals. The agents are supposed to fulfil these goals but they have their own goals they 
want to reach. There is thus an inherent conflict between the interests of the principals 
and the agents. In a democracy, the citizens are the principals, and the (professional) 
politicians are the agents supposed to act in the interests of the citizens.  
In fact, the politicians often behave as if they were the masters, and they often take it 
for granted that the citizens have to follow what they order. A realistic model of the 
politicians’ behaviour assumes that politicians have four goals: they want to exert 
power over the citizens; they want to be recognized or even loved by the population; 
they often wish to pursue a certain ideology; and they are interested in gaining 
income. The goals pursued by politicians are thus not different from other people. 
Politicians in democracies are subject to a re-election constraint. They can only stay in 
power if they get sufficient support from the voters. Another constraint is the outbreak 
of scandals which sometimes force politicians to give up their position when the 
pressure from the citizens become intensive. Politicians should not be seen as being 
directly interested in the welfare of their citizens (though, of course, they claim to do 
so); rather, if the re-election and scandal constraints are strong enough, politicians are 
forced to follow the citizens’ wishes.  
The citizens in a representative democracy are severely limited in influencing the 
behaviour of politicians. Essentially, they can only make their wishes felt at election 
time, normally all four or five years. The citizens in referendum democracies have a 
much larger set of instruments available to assert their wishes. Of course, in no 
referendum democracy the citizens take all political decisions. There is a parliament 
and a government as is the case in a representative democracy. The crucial difference 
is that neither parliament nor government has the power to take a final decision. In all 
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matters the citizens are the sovereign who has the last say. The instruments consist in 
obligatory referenda (for constitutional changes and major decisions); optional 
referenda (for less important issues, depending on a sufficient number of citizens 
wanting to have a referendum); popular initiatives which force parliament and 
government to hold a referendum; and recall allowing voters to force executive 
politicians to resign if they are deemed to do a bad or dishonourable job.  
The instruments of (semi-) direct democracy should not be seen in terms of a 
mechanistic process in which the citizens tell the politicians what to do. Rather, 
referendum democracy is characterized by an intensive discursive process between 
citizens and politicians. This takes place before a referendum where the politicians 
have to make an effort to inform the citizens and to convince them that the course of 
action they take is in the interests of the citizens. Often, the voters agree and support 
the actions designed by parliament and government. In Switzerland there are many 
cases in which the citizens approved that they are more highly taxes if they felt that 
the money needed is well spent. However, quite often the citizens do not follow the 
course the politicians want not least because they see or at least sense that the actions 
are more in the interests of the “political class” rather than of the citizens.  
 
IV. Referendum democracy 
There are a few countries with significant elements of direct democracy, in particular 
Australia. A large share of American States (but not the US national state) has 
referenda, initiatives and recall, such as for instance Oregon1. Some European states 
have used referenda to decide on whether to enter the European Union, to introduce 
the Euro, or to decide on European constitutional proposals. By far the largest number 
of referenda has been undertaken in Switzerland.  
Most representative democracies do not give their citizens the right to decide on 
matters of content; this is entirely left to the professional politicians. An example is 
Germany. Though its constitution  (called Grundgesetz) would in principle allow 
referenda, no referenda have been admitted or undertaken at the federal level. At the 
state and communal level there are some efforts to introduce direct democratic 
elements. But up to now, the voters have few possibilities. Direct democratic elements 
are also absent in most international and supra-national organizations. In the United 
Nations system it is completely absent, in the European Union nearly so.  
 
These are the strengths of referendum democracy: 
- First of all, as democracy means that there is self-determination in 
politics, it is the very idea of democracy that the citizens are able to 
decide on matters of content. Representative democracy is at best an 
indirect and incomplete way to follow the wishes of the voters. 
- Referenda are the most effective means to control the politicians. The 
voters as a collective are difficult to influence, manipulate or corrupt 
by a politicians in order to serve their ends. It is much simpler to do 
that with a small group of persons. In representative democracies 
                                                 
1 In most of these States the direct democratic instruments work well. California is an 
exception, the reason being that the citizens have to decide on too many issues at a 
time. It is not rare that they are supposed to decide over 40 propositions overtaxing 
the citizens. In contrast, in Switzerland there are typically 2 issues at the local level, 2 
at the cantonal level and 2 at the federal level. The citizens can easily distinguish them 
because they normally refer to quite different issues. 
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politicians are controlled only by the elections taking place every four 
or five years, and in some few cases by high courts. The latter are, 
however, easier to manipulate than the electorate as a whole, i.e. 
promises of rewards and threats are more effective. Moreover, the 
courts members are also members of the “classe politique”, and often 
know, and are personally connected to the politicians in question. They 
are therefore reluctant to take action against them. 
- There is a considerable number of beneficial effects of referenda on 
economic outcomes. Exploiting the fact that the extent of direct 
political participation rights differs between the 26 Swiss cantons (and 
also considering the respective differences in communes) research has 
identified that in cantons with more extensive direct democratic rights 
(such as in the canton Basel Landschaft) compared to those with less 
extensive rights (such as e.g. Geneva)  
- public services are provided more efficiently (Pommerehne 
1987) {Pommerehne, 1987 #52}; 
- public debt is lower (Feld and Kirchgässner 1999); 
- tax evasion is lower (Frey 1997) 
- per capita incomes are higher (Feld and Savioz 1997); 
- people are more satisfied with their lives (Frey and Stutzer 
2002, Frey 2008). 
  These results have been reached by keeping a large number of 
controlling factors constant and by using generally accepted econometric 
techniques. Similar results have also been reached in comparisons 
between American States with more or less extensive political 
participation possibilities of the citizens.  
What matters most, however, is that a referendum democracy with citizens as the 
sovereign exists in reality. The example of Switzerland shows that it is able to work 
and that it does not lead to bad outcomes. After all, Switzerland is generally 
acknowledged to be a reasonably well-functioning country2 and that its inhabitants 
state that they have a very high level of life satisfaction3. 
  
Direct democracy has, as any other institution existing, also its weaknesses. The 
following aspects are usually mentioned: 
- Citizens are said to be uninterested and uninformed about political 
issues. This is certainly the case in a representative democracy because 
the voters cannot exert any influence. A low level of interest and 
information should be considered to be a rational reaction to the way 
the political system is organized. For most citizens it makes little sense 
to get informed as the decisions are anyway taken by their 
representatives in parliament and government. In contrast, when 
citizens are able to co-determine on issues of content, they have an 
incentive to get informed. An analysis (Benz and Stutzer 2004) 
undertaken across European nations, some of which allowed their 
                                                 
2 In the recent ranking of the “Best Country in the World” presented by Newsweek 
(2010) Switzerland is second after Finland (but it has been shown that this ranking is 
due to an arithmetic error, and that indeed Switzerland ranks first). 
3 The second highest after Denmark according to the recent Gallup World Survey see 
Deaton (2008), Frey and Stutzer 2002, Frey 2008. 
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citizens to participate in referenda on issues related to the European 
Union, empirically supports this point. Citizens in countries allowing 
such direct political participation proved to be better informed about 
political issues than citizens in countries not permitting such 
participation. 
- Citizens are, on average, less well educated than professional 
politicians. This is certainly true. It may well be argued that it makes 
sense to have a division of labour between persons specializing in 
making politics and the rest of society. However, the advantage of the 
division of labour is strongly reduced by the fact that once elected, and 
until the next election comes near, they have little interest in knowing 
the citizens’ wishes, nor following them. Moreover, referenda serve to 
decide basic issues, and not technicalities. In a referendum democracy 
the politicians have to inform citizens about these basic consideration 
in which benefits and costs need to be evaluated. To evaluate the 
benefits and costs is not a matter of education but of preferences, and 
democracy is that type of regime in which the evaluation of all citizens 
is to count. 
- It may be claimed that the voters often take “wrong” decisions. This 
charge is fundamentally mistaken because the institution of a 
referendum democracy accepts the results of the vote (provided it has 
been taken according to the rules and has not been manipulated), and 
there is no basis to argue that it is right or wrong. The political elite 
tends to call decisions wrong if they do not correspond to what they 
think themselves. But this feeling is irrelevant.   
It can, moreover, be pointed out that referendum democracies 
obviously have not resulted in such bad decisions as to lead to 
catastrophic mistakes. As pointed out above, the opposite seems to 
hold: it can well be argued that referendum democracies perform better 
than representative democracies. 
- Referendum democracies are criticized because the decisions are 
cumbersome and slow. This is to some extent true. The political 
decision process does not end when the parliament and/or the 
government has taken a decision but it has to be waited until it is clear 
whether the citizens want a referendum, and if so, what its result is. 
This process is little elegant. The right of women to vote has on the 
federal level indeed been introduced very late (1973) but since then 
women have reached a strong position in politics. For example, three 
out of seven members of the Bundesrat, the federal executive, are 
women (as of August 2010). The voting right of women was 
introduced at about the same time that in the United States the blacks 
(and other minorities) got their factual (rather than formal) voting 
right. 
 
The discussion makes clear that the referendum democracy is far from being an ideal. 
But this judgment applies to all political regimes. It would be easy to list many 
shortcomings of representative democracies. What matters is a comparative 
evaluation. 
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V. Why so few referendum democracies? 
In view of the great advantages of direct democratic elements one wonders why 
they play such a small role in most countries of the world, even in otherwise 
staunch democracies. The reason has to do with the incentives of politicians. 
Giving the citizens the right to have the last say reduces the power and influence 
of professional politicians. They therefore have a strong incentive to oppose its 
introduction. This even applies to politicians in Switzerland who try to exploit 
every opportunity to reduce the scope of direct democratic decisions. Fortunately, 
the referendum rights are secured in the constitution the politicians cannot 
unilaterally change.  
Direct democratic elements can be introduced from above or below. Introducing 
referenda on the federal or super-national level has the advantage that the 
questions at hand are of particular importance, and have therefore been discussed 
in the media so that the voters tend to be quite well informed. A country could 
also start at the level of communes in which many decisions are easy to 
understand for citizens who get the chance to decide and therefore must learn to 
understand the issues. In some cases governments have used referenda when they 
were at a loss what to do, or when the pressure from the street was particularly 
strong. Under these circumstances there is the danger that a referendum becomes a 
plebiscite in which the government pushes the voters to support the decision they 
prefer. They project the image that there are terrible consequences if the plebiscite 
is not approved which leaves the voters little option than to go along. Plebiscites 
therefore differ from referenda where the citizens have a serious option between 
alternatives, and the government has to put the decision into reality.  
 
Direct democratic elements may be taken to be an innovation in countries solely 
based on political representation. From the point of view of the countries already 
having, and using, referenda they are far from being an innovation. Rather, they 
could be looked at as a necessary ingredient for democracy in the 21st century. 
In the following, other innovations in democracy are considered. The next section 
shortly discusses some possibilities with respect to voting rules and procedures. 
 
VI. Innovative voting rules and procedures 
In most democracies, voting is restricted to citizens of the country. This need not 
be so. It is well possible to give voting rights to foreigners who have lived in the 
country for some time. It might also be discussed whether some sort of balance 
should be applied with respect to age. As the young can only vote at a particular 
age (often 18, but sometimes 16 or 21), one could establish that the old lose their 
voting right at, say, age 80. A more general issue is how to make the interests of 
future generations felt in the political process. One possibility would be to give the 
parents additional votes according to the number of children. Another – so far not 
discussed - possibility would be to give younger voters (e.g. those of age 18 to 38) 
the right to determine the old age pensions of the politicians. The latter would then 
become an incentive to specially care for the interests of the younger part of the 
citizenry. Yet another innovation would give the voting right for restricted periods 
only. If, for instance, a manager works for five years in a foreign country, he or 
she would be allowed to vote there, but upon leaving would loose this privilege. 
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Originally, direct political participation rights were exercised in citizens’ 
assemblies4. In almost all representative democracies the citizens are required to 
cast their vote at a particular day and within particular hours in a voting booth. In 
some democracies voting by mail is possible (e.g. in Switzerland). The next step 
would be electronic voting which so far has only been introduced sparingly and as 
an experiment. An extreme variant would be to give citizens the possibility to 
decide political issues all the time and for all issues. It should be carefully 
considered whether such an electronic democracy is desirable. It seems that the 
important interaction between the politicians and the citizens before voting would 
be undermined. 
Another innovative extension of democracy would be to elect the delegates in 
international organizations by the citizens. This could also be the case for national 
institutions independent from government, such as the members of courts5, the 
governing board of the central bank and the management of functional 
jurisdictions6. 
 
VII. Innovations beyond traditional democracy 
So far, various extensions have been discussed serving to renew the type of 
democracy currently existing. But it is also possible to go beyond and to suggest 
major changes. With respect to decision rules, “voting by veto” (Mueller 1978) or 
voting by imposing a tax on negative externalities produced (Tideman and 
Tullock 1976). 
I want to direct attention on voting rules using a random mechanism. A great 
advantage of using lot or probabilities is that they are able to reflect the 
preferences of the citizens more closely than does simple majority voting. An 
example is “probability majority voting” (Frey 1969). Consider the decision to 
establish a bridge. It is only possible to build it, or not to build it. According to 
simple majority voting, the bridge would be built if 51% approve, even if 49% of 
the voters oppose it. The innovation is to build the bridge with a probability of 
51%. This can be done by putting 51 green balls and 49 red balls into an urn and 
then to randomly choose one ball. If it is green, the bridge should be built, if it is 
red, it should not be built. But the bridge has been built with a probability of 51%. 
One major advantage of this proposal is that the majority and minority get exactly 
the weight they deserve, while with majority voting the interests of the minority a 
totally neglected. This procedure has also been applied to point voting (Intriligator 
1973).  
 
Demarchy (Burnheim 2006, Léon 1988) uses a random mechanism to select 
members of parliament (and other institutions). By lot citizens are selected to 
serve in parliament. This guarantees that the members of parliament correspond 
exactly to the citizenry. Nobody has an incentive to spend time, effort and money7 
                                                 
4 This is still the case in many communes and in the few remaining Swiss 
Landsgemeinden. 
5 This possibility exists in the United States and in Switzerland. 
6 See the proposal to establish FOCJ, or “Functional, Overlapping, Competing 
Jurisdictions” in Frey and Eichenberger (1999).  
7 The huge expenditures of persons wanting to enter parliament or having an 
executive position has become a problem in many democracies, especially in the 
United States. 
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to be elected, and nobody has an incentive to use corruption in order to manipulate 
the composition of parliament. To use lots in politics has supported by Aristotle in 
his Politeia, book 4. Demarchy has indeed been used in classical Athens, in the 
republic of Venice to select the doge, today for citizens’ assemblies in Canada and 
Australia, as well as for juries and internet governing bodies.  
 
VIII. Conclusions 
 
Democracy is one of the great ideas of mankind, and arguably the greatest of human 
innovations. As an idea, and not necessarily as a practice, democracy has been 
extremely successful. Every political regime wants to be called democratic. This 
development has a downside. The idea of democracy has become “sacred” and has 
been made immune against criticism and further developments. This is unfortunate 
because the very idea of democracy is that it is a living and dynamic institution in 
constant need of change and improvement. 
Direct democratic elements are such a development. It has been argued that it has 
many desirable features and that it therefore should be the democracy of the 21st 
century.  
Yet it is possible to go further. Democracy can be extended by introducing new voting 
rules, in particular opening the voting rights to new persons. Similarly, voting 
procedures can go beyond current voting at one particular day and closely described 
hours. The internet opens new possibilities which should be seriously considered. 
The most innovative extension of democracy uses random mechanisms enabling a 
fuller representation of views and persons. Thus, “probability majority voting” takes 
into account the interests of voters in the minority. Demarchy allows an exact 
representation of the citizenry in parliament and the executive. Each of these 
democratic innovations also has negative aspects. Demarchy, for instance, solely 
focuses on full representation of the citizenry but disregards that best suited persons 
should be selected as politicians. There is thus a trade-off between representation and 
suitability to be faced. 
This paper does not argue that these innovations should be introduced. Rather, they 
serve to open the discussion by suggesting new ideas.   
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